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Abstract
We combine Minsky’s Wnancial fragility analysis, behavioural analysis of decision rules and the
evolutionary economics of rule trajectories to provide an empirically grounded and computationally
tractable theory of the complex evolutionary dynamics of speculative Wnancial upswings. The behav-
ioural dynamics of asset bubbles can be conceptualized as the joint consequence of the adoption and
diVusion process of new investment decision rules coupled with the degradation of those rules as they
pass from a few expert investors to larger population of amateurs. We illustrate this using data cover-
ing the recent Brisbane property market bubble (1999–2003) and show how it is consistent with the
existence of such cascading decision rules. We then explain how multi-agent simulation methods can
be used for modelling decision rule cascades.
©  2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Macroeconomic theory has plausible and straightforward explanations both for asset
price movements that take the form of small, rapid, step-like adjustments to changes in the
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‘state of the news’, and for precipitous leaps or crashes in asset prices. The former are read-
ily explained in terms of the ‘eYcient markets hypothesis’ and ‘rational expectations
hypothesis’. These presume that decision makers rapidly acquire the same set of relevant
information for appraising potential asset yields and are not prone to be systematically
wrong in the appraisals they make.
New information – for example, the release of new economic statistics, or regarding a
political event, discovery of new deposits of a natural resource, or an unexpected invention –
will only temporarily cause trading and asset price movements, for soon it will become
widely known and the vector of relative prices of assets will settle at a new conWguration
whereupon assets oVer identical risk and carrying cost-adjusted yields. This analysis rings
true on days when it is reported that, say, the release of a country’s balance of payments
Wgures had no impact on the value of its currency because they were ‘what the market
expected’, or when there was an instantaneous adjustments up or down in the value of the
currency because they were better or worse than expected.
The possibility of precipitous price movements is emphasized in Keynes’s (1936) work
as something that arises if decision makers start holding similar expectations about prices.
Keynes’s (1936) discussion of the determination of interest rates portrays the orderly func-
tioning of asset markets as requiring diVerences in the expectations held by wealth holders.
People who are holding cash and foregoing the interest they might have earned by holding
bonds are doing so because they fear bond prices will fall and give them a capital loss that
is not oVset by the interest yield – a view that is evidently not shared by those who are hold-
ing bonds rather than cash. If everyone believed bond prices were going to fall, no one
would be willing to hold bonds and their prices would collapse as bond owners sought to
sell them and found no buyers. This convergence-driven instability is pretty much the kind
of thing that happens in episodes of hyperinXation (when it is clear that money is an asset
that no one in their right mind should hold) or in a share market crash.
The intermediate case, of asset price movements that are ongoing over periods of
months or years, is more complex to analyse and the present paper is oVered as a contribu-
tion in this area. We suggest that phenomena such as the emergence of a boom in the mar-
ket for residential investment properties involve something rather more complex than
merely a succession of adjustments to a Xow of new information about the performance of
real estate investments relative to other assets.
Like Minsky (1975), we take the view that as booms gather pace people change their
investment strategies and start taking risks they previously were not taking. In this sort of
context, Keynes’s emphasis on diVerences between speculators’ views of market prospects
seems a better starting point than the mainstream rational expectations view. An obvious
next step is to imagine an increasing convergence of how speculators see investment pros-
pects. This leads to two questions: the Wrst is how such a process might occur; the second is
whether such a process is inherently prone to lead to a kind of collectively irrational expec-
tation about the returns their investments might deliver, ultimately leading to a precipitous
market correction.
In exploring the forces underlying the dynamics of speculative episodes we apply and
extend several ideas from behavioural and evolutionary economics regarding the nature of
decision-making processes (Earl, 1986; Earl & Potts, 2004). These lead us to posit that a
‘decision rule cascade’ is a particular form of what Dopfer, Foster, and Potts (2004) and
Dopfer and Potts (forthcoming) call a ‘meso trajectory’. But whereas most meso trajecto-
ries increase the value and complexity of a rule at the same time, a decision rule cascade is
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degenerative in that an increasingly simpliWed rule replicates. Decision rule cascades
amongst the population of wealth holders may therefore drive speculative episodes, but the
way such a cascade works does not tend to result in everyone trying to follow the same
speculative decision rule. SpeciWcally, we posit that complex and subtle expert decision
rules experience a kind of entropic degradation as they are sequentially adopted by a grow-
ing population of amateur speculators.
The paper is divided into four sections and a conclusion. First, we introduce the decision
rule cascade idea and contrast it with the now well-established information cascade notion.
Secondly, we consider how decision rules may suVer degradation as they are passed from
agent to agent along a spectrum from expert to amateur speculators. Thirdly, we examine
how a cascade of partially degrading decision rules may generate a boom in a market dur-
ing which some players will tend to fare far better than others and, fourthly, we suggest
how this may be modelled.
2. Decision rule cascades versus information cascades
Until fairly recently, an emphasis on the role of crowd behaviour in shaping the way
the macroeconomy functions was conWned to a small group of economists that Codding-
ton (1976) labelled as ‘fundamentalist Keynesians’. Members of this group emphasized
tendencies for investors to take cues from each other about possible changes in market
conditions and that success in investment decisions requires an ability to anticipate how
‘the market’ thinks and how it will respond to particular changes in the ‘state of the
news’. On this view, asset markets could be prone to suVer from collective mood swings
and become increasingly jittery when a boom has been strong. This is because speculators
will be conscious of the need to be amongst the Wrst to sell assets if they are to realize
maximum capital gains when the market reaches a turning point. A discontinuous shift
from boom to crash may thus come from some investors crossing a psychological thresh-
old in terms of nervousness about the sustainability of the existing price structure, rather
than from any particular objective threshold having been crossed (Minsky, 1975; Shackle,
1974).
In contrast to the network-based view of choice in the fundamentalist Keynesian litera-
ture, the traditional mainstream approach was to model investment choices in a reduction-
ist manner as if they were being made by well-informed representative agents whose
preferences represented a microcosm of stable, aggregated preferences of all the individuals
who form the economy as a whole. It is diYcult to explain the existence of speculative bub-
bles from this perspective and the literature has sought to resolve this in several broad
directions (see Raines & Leathers, 2000). One approach is the behavioural Wnance litera-
ture (e.g. Shiller, 2000), which introduces systematic biases in risk preference, framing
eVects and suchlike in order to explain systematic departures from rational behaviour.
Another approach is to focus on the sequence of information transmission itself in a spec-
ulative market. Theoretical work on information cascades by writers such as Diamond and
Dybvig (1983), Bannerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) consi-
ders how markets function when it takes time for information relevant to choices to spread
between decision makers. In this kind of work, unlike that of the fundamentalist Keyne-
sians, decisions are still Wrmly anchored in given preferences, but people may make their
choices at diVerent times depending on when they receive information that removes the
uncertainty that is otherwise inhibiting investment.
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De Vany’s (2004) book Hollywood Economics provides an excellent example of a market
in which information cascades are a major driving force for the volume of sales. (In this
context, price has little role to play since cinemas normally operate with Wxed price and
charge the same price to a customer regardless of which movie they wish to see.) A movie is
an example of an ‘experience good’ (cf. Nelson, 1970): one cannot know for sure whether it
is worth consuming until one has consumed it. Unless one has access to reviews by Wlm
critics or has heard reports from friends and/or acquaintances, it is very hard to know in
advance whether a particular Wlm is going to be worth watching. Hence demand is crucially
dependent on the spread of published and word-of-mouth reports. The thing to notice here
is that the reports serve to resolve uncertainty about a Wlm’s characteristics – the quality of
the acting, the plot, whether it is far too long and loses the audience’s interest, and so on –
that you are likely to experience if you go to see it. Social network eVects of this kind have
much the same role to play with regard to the diVusion of innovations, where there is initial
uncertainty about whether they are worth adopting.
In the context of decision-making in speculative markets such as those for shares and
investment properties, however, the information cascade idea has a rather secondary role
to play. For one thing, the proposition of eYcient markets theorists, that all relevant infor-
mation is rapidly transmitted to all market participants, may here be quite a reasonable
approximation as the Wnancial press and websites make information widely available
within minutes or hours of its release and, moreover, automated trading strategies can pro-
cess that information and execute trades within seconds. Yet despite this, booms in share
and property markets take time to gather pace. Secondly, and more importantly, the infor-
mation that is available relates to past performances of particular assets, or to factors that
might aVect their future performances, but it is not information about what the relative
future performances of rival assets will be. Its signiWcance depends on its interpretation.
The interpretation issue is missing from areas to which the information cascade idea
had been applied. For example, information about a new movie’s characteristics tells us
whether we will like it if we have preferences for particular kinds of movies; in mainstream
analyses, these preferences are taken as given. By contrast, the signiWcance of socially
transmitted information about the state of the property market, or about what others have
experienced (say, in terms of vacancy rates and maintenance costs of investment apart-
ments that friends have purchased) depends upon what decision rules we have for apprais-
ing investment possibilities and/or the kinds of rules we have for learning – that is to say,
our rules for adjusting our investment rules.
Another way of putting this is in the terms proposed by Ryle (1949): information about
market indicators is of the ‘know that’ variety, but for it to be of any use requires relevant
expertise/an appropriate capability – in other words, it requires ‘know how’. Whereas
rational expectations theorists presume that decision-makers interpret information in
terms of mainstream economic models on the basis of an inductive learning process (see
the critique by Boland, 1986), we suggest that it may be fruitful to think of decision makers
in highly uncertain speculative markets as using (variants of) decision rules that they have
picked up from others as their means of interpreting and acting upon information and,
indeed, for selecting which kinds of information to gather.
This perspective is entirely consistent with the Keynesian position, and indeed Keynes
(1937) himself made a number of suggestions about broad kinds of rules that people use
for coping with non-probabilistic uncertainty, such as following the majority in the belief
that other people are better informed than we are. Where our perspective is novel is in its
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emphasis on how rules may be quite complex and get transformed as they get transmitted
from person to person and because it entails a multi-level view of decision rules: a decision
maker may encounter many potentially useful rules for making investment decisions in the
course of social life, and hence needs higher-level rules for choosing between them. For
example, one might use information about the credentials and/or personal wealth of a per-
son who was advocating a particular investment rule as a basis for deciding whether their
strategy is worth adopting.
Decision rules play a central role in behavioural and evolutionary economics (see e.g.
Dopfer et al., 2004; Earl, 2001; Hodgson, Samuels, & Tool, 1994; Witt, 2003) as tools for
coping with uncertainty and complexity, with rules that perform poorly in a particular
context being prone to be de-selected in favour of those that appear to be delivering better
outcomes (or agents who fail to change dysfunctional rules being de-selected as market
players due to, say, bankruptcy). If we possess eYcacious decision rules, our need for cer-
tain kinds of information or for social networks for obtaining information may be reduced.
In the case of the demand for movies, a rule that says ‘a Wlm that is directed by and/or stars
particular people, whom we rate highly on the basis of their previous work, cannot be terri-
ble, for they would not risk their reputations on an inherently bad project’ obviates the
need to Wnd out what others have made of it. Knowing that a particular critic has given it a
four-star rating may be suYcient as a basis for choice even if we know nothing about its
plot, if our rule is ‘only watch four- or Wve-star movies’. Likewise, if our preferred rule for
investing is ‘do what Warren BuVett does’, then all we need to know is what investments
Warren BuVett is making, while if our rule is ‘only invest in residential property’, we
greatly reduce the set of information we need. In each case, the decision rule comes prior to
the information gathering.
What we are suggesting about the social origins of many people’s investment decision
rules is an extension of thinking in a recent paper in which Earl and Potts (2004) use the
decision rule perspective to look at the origins of preferences in today’s complex and rap-
idly changing world. The suggestion there is that economic agents trade decision rules with
each other socially, after specialising in developing expertise in particular product areas.
Consumers are presumed to have well deWned high-level preferences, but to need to acquire
capabilities regarding what to do in order to act upon such preferences. Those with rele-
vant expertise supply them with rules that have the form ‘if X is what you are trying to
achieve, then Y is a good means of achieving it’. The ‘market for preferences’ entails such
rules being supplied both by professionals (such as sales personnel, consumer journalists or
specialist consultants such as interior designers) and by members of their social networks,
or friends of friends, known for their expertise.
Our contention is that much the same process applies in speculative markets: decision
rules cascade from person to person, springing initially from those who appear to know
what they are doing in the context in question. Property speculators, for example, may
spread their wisdom by writing books on ‘how to make your fortune in real estate’, by run-
ning pay-to-attend investment seminars, or through exchanging their ideas socially, for
example, with their accountants, dentists, Rotary club and Masonic colleagues, at dinner
parties, and so on. In turn, others will copy those who pick up the ideas and who appear to
be prospering by applying them. Thus the property speculators’ dentists’ assistants start to
seek ways of getting investment properties of their own, and are then copied by their
friends, who in turn become role models for yet other members of their social networks.
As they choose particular kinds of decision rules, investors may seek to reWne them by
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studying what others with expertise in the same area are advocating. For example, having
decided to concentrate on residential property investments, a person may seek out books
by pundits in this area and study the views of real estate professional as reported in the
Wnancial press, and so on. In turn, others may pick up the rules that they synthesize and
make further modiWcations.
In common with many social networks, the network by which decision rules spread will
not be a random one; rather, as our references to the role of noted pundits and specialized
publications imply, it will be more in the form of a ‘scale-free’ network in which some
nodes are highly connected hubs but most are rather weakly connected (for a thorough
and useful review of the networks literature, see Dorogovtsev & Mendes, 2003). The deci-
sion rule cascade process shares this network property with information cascades such as
those where movie critics’ rating have a major role in shaping how well movies fare at the
box oYce. However, in contrast to the spread of information in today’s information tech-
nology-rich world, the cascading of decision rules is a process that inherently takes non-
trivial amounts of time. In the case of property speculation, it takes time to raise Wnance
and Wnd suitable properties and for paper proWts to become evident if the market does
indeed rise, and those who attempt to copy such strategies will likewise take time to imple-
ment them.
3. The process of rule degradation
Lags in the social transmission of decision rules are likely to mean that those who
acquire them far down the cascade will be employing rules that Wt the changing environ-
ment far less well than they did at the time they were applied by those that originated them.
For investment strategies to match a changing environment, they may need to be in the
form of systems of rules that specify how strategies should be adjusted as an investment
cycle unfolds. If so, what needs to be transmitted from one decision maker to another is
going to be quite complex. Even if the decision environment is static, the rules for making
the most of it may comprise systems of interlinked ‘if–then’ requirements.
Where decision rules are complex, a decision rule cascade seems likely to operate rather
like the schoolyard game known as ‘the telephone game’ or ‘Chinese whispers’, in which
players arrange themselves in a circle and whisper in the ear of the player on one side of
them the message they think they have had whispered in their own ear by the player on
their other side. By the time the message is relayed back to the person who initiated it, the
wording has typically changed greatly. In the context of messages about investment strate-
gies, what we suggest is likely to happen is not necessarily that the message is completely
lost or turned around but that details and qualiWcations are lost as it is passed from person
to person. In the case of dot-com stock investment rules, for example, early 1990s expert
venture capitalists had rules about speciWcally which management and talent teams went
with which new business models under which Wnancial plans, and under which customer
proWles; by the late 1990s, the idea that there might be money to be made from such invest-
ments had achieved much wider currency but at the cost of degenerating into a simple rule
of buying any stock ending in dot-com. Much the same thing happened with electronics in
the 1960s and radio in the 1930s and at many other times both between and before (see
Chancellor, 1999).
As far as property investments are concerned, there is a world of diVerence between bas-
ing purchases around a simple ‘location, location, location’ decision rule that operates with
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reference to a list of suburbs widely known to be ‘desirable’, and having at one’s disposal
the result of a hedonic pricing model that pinpoints precisely how much particular loca-
tion-related characteristics such as distance from the CBD add to median property values.
Likewise, an expert speculator in investment property might be using an investment deci-
sion rule that says ‘buy un-renovated two-bedroom apartments within two miles of the
CBD or university, that are between Wve and 20 years old, within two minutes’ walk from
public transport routes, and with afternoon sun, and then renovate them only by ƒand
then realize capital gains by selling them whenƒ’. By the time the message has been trans-
mitted many stages down the cascade, it might simply read ‘invest in rental apartments in
the city and wait’.
We are not trying to suggest that the spread of a decision rule necessarily results in the
generation of variants that are inferior to the original. To make such a suggestion would be
to ignore lessons from business history, which is littered with examples of cases where Wrms
that pioneered particular strategies for success failed to capture substantial rents because,
whilst their broad intuition was correct, the way that they executed it was Xawed, and oth-
ers who observed what they were doing were able to infer much better ways of making it
reliable, practical or included whatever else turned out to be key features required by cus-
tomers (for example, contrast the original De Havilland Comet jet airliner and the Boeing
707, or the original 12-inch Philips Laservision disc technology versus the DVD). Within a
population of investors we would not be surprised to Wnd a proportion of astute decision
makers who might accept a highly simpliWed basic proposition such as ‘to make money,
invest in rental apartments’ but who also possessed higher-level rules that (a) led them to
judge that they lacked experience of investing in this market and (b) required them address
this deWciency by taking time to acquire or synthesize a more reWned version of the rule
before they invested. (Dopfer & Potts (forthcoming) call these second-order rules, i.e. rules
about how to choose rules, and argue that they are essential to the process of economic
evolution.) Other decision-makers, however, might lack rules for going about reWning a
simpliWed rule, and hence end up making decisions that proved to be expensive mistakes –
for example, because they lacked expertise for judging older apartments and getting
makeovers done in a cost-eVective manner. They might provide ready fodder for property
developers that were selling ‘oV the plan’, where scope for capital gains might be smaller
and where carrying costs in terms of body corporate fees eat more heavily into current cash
Xows.
Degradation of decision rules will result from opportunism (in the sense of Williamson,
1975) and tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1958). The opportunistic purveyor of decision rules
may have good reason in terms of self-interest for suggesting rules that are somewhat
diVerent from what he or she has actually be using, or simpler in form. It may take less
eVort to convey such rules and/or their use by others could generate demand for assets that
he or she presently owns, or a partial revelation of the rules may help the supposed expert
to stay one step ahead of the market and thus make more money. Where tacit knowledge
problems arise, the issue is not that a rule system is deliberately misrepresented but rather
that the supplier is unable to articulate it in full detail or in a way that ensures it will be
understood and capable of being applied in an identical manner by the recipient. Tacit
knowledge is problematic even with something as seemingly simple as a basic cookery task:
recipe books can diVer quite markedly as they try to explain the ‘knack’ of, say, separating
an egg white from its yolk (for examples, see Earl & Wakeley, 2005, Section 5.4). The prob-
lem of supplying capabilities for coping with speculative markets is exactly the same, in
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principle, as that entailed in technology transfer arrangements (Nelson & Winter, 1982) or
when students try to obtain knowledge by listening to a teacher or reading a textbook:
even if a thorough description is supplied, there is no guarantee that a boundedly rational
recipient will ‘get it’ or ‘pick it up’ in its entirety.
Decision makers are likely periodically to be ‘in the market’ for new investment decision
rules produced by ‘experts’ owing to disappointment with the outcomes they have been
achieving by applying particular rule systems. There will thus be a latent market for new
rules and/or churning in the use of existing rules: as is evident from the market for books
by business gurus, there is a fashion/fad element in the demand for strategies for making
money in a changing, uncertain world. It will not merely be users of simplistic decision
rules (such as the indiscriminate ‘invest in rental apartments’ rule) that are likely to be dis-
appointed and open to new ways of investing. Many of the rule systems that people end up
using will be at odds with rules based on an acceptance of the unpredictability of Wnancial
markets. Whereas the latter rules promote investing in passive unit trusts based on the
market index, and diversifying portfolios across classes of assets, people who are reluctant
to accept the unpredictability of markets and to base investment strategies on that unpre-
dictability will be susceptible to systems based on trying consistently to achieve better
returns than the market as a whole (for example, by using complex decision rules that
focus on property investment). They will be attracted by systems that seem to be making
others wealthy, even though such people have merely been lucky temporarily to be able to
achieve above-average returns. As a result, they might, for example, switch from property
investment to putting a disproportionate part of their wealth into ostrich farming or dot-
com stocks.
4. SigniWcance of decision rule cascades in speculative cycles
The consequences of having one’s investment decision rule (approximately) copied
diVer sharply depending on whether the investment involves the expansion of productive
capacity or the purchase of existing assets whose supply is diYcult to augment. In the
former case, emulation of one’s choice will reduce the yield of the investment by depressing
market prices (except in cases where demand is a positive function of the number of suppli-
ers, because a greater visibility of the product generates interest in it). Going public with
one’s investment philosophy regarding capacity expansion choices only makes sense if one
is aware that others might independently reach similar conclusions and is seeking to pre-
empt any bids they might make to win sales in that market (cf. Porter, 1980, pp. 335–338).
Where assets are diYcult to reproduce rapidly, the decision rule may be self-fulWlling as the
prices of the assets will increase, giving capital gains to early movers into the market. Here,
it is not just the pioneers of the decision rule who stand to make money from sharing it
with others but also the media, such as newspapers and magazines that report the sup-
posed wisdom of the pioneers. For example, by running prominent real estate sections,
newspapers may generate substantial revenue from real estate advertising as people seek to
relocate to areas that are reported as having more potential for capital gains.
A crucial point to note when considering how a decision rule cascade aVects the opera-
tions of a market such as real estate, where the stock of existing assets is large relative to
the Xow of new output, is that one investor can only buy into it if another is selling out. To
a certain extent, stock becomes available for reasons that have nothing to do with specula-
tion, such as changes of domestic circumstances (in the case of real estate: children leaving
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the family home, marital break-ups, retirement, death or job relocations). Otherwise, how-
ever, the lag in a decision rule cascade is necessary for the pioneer to be able to buy into the
market at a price that will soon appear to have been a bargain. If experienced property
speculators judge that bigger potential gains can be had by, say, selling out of inner city
apartments and buying into an as yet under-developed beachfront suburb, their biggest
chance of making an easy sale and a bargain buy comes if owners of properties in the
beachfront suburb are laggards in adopting the ‘inner city apartments’ decision rule. The
savvy decision rule pioneers might subsequently spot potential for greater capital gains in
apartments near a local university, selling their beachfront properties for top-dollar prices
to investors who are selling their inner city apartments to even later adopters of the ‘inner
city apartment’ rule, who in turn are selling their apartments near the university in order to
buy in to what they believe (mistakenly, in the eyes of the savvy players) to be bigger pros-
pects of capital gains.
Clearly, the way we have just aligned a sequence of overlapping property market decision
rule cascades with chains of transactions in investment properties is rather fanciful. How-
ever, it at least signals that if the same investors were, respectively, at the front and the end of
each decision rule cascade, great inequalities in investment returns would be expected, as is
evident in practice. In an actual property boom, to judge from Peng’s (2004) detailed study
of the geography of capital gains in the Brisbane property market during 1998–2003, prop-
erty prices move unevenly through time across diVerent suburbs. There are neither roughly
uniform rises that one might expect from population growth, nor systematically higher
increases towards the city centre and along major transport arteries as a reXection of chang-
ing transport costs as the city spreads further and further. Rather, one may see a combina-
tion of sustained above average price growth for certain kinds of properties of inherently
limited supply (at or close to the beach or river waterfront) and temporary ‘hot spots’ scat-
tered around the wider city, that oVer even more spectacular gains for those who spot them
at an early stage. In other words, the situation is rather reminiscent of a share market with
‘blue chip’ stocks and previously neglected stocks in which interest Xares up brieXy.
The existence of temporary hot spots is readily understandable when there is a combina-
tion of a large geographical area with a hundred or more suburbs, and boundedly rational
investors unable to keep in mind what is happening in more than a fraction of them at a
time. In such a situation, more alert investors may notice that some suburbs are underval-
ued and, in buying up what is on oVer, generate price increases that stand out enough to
capture wider attention. No single decision rule would stand out as obvious to adopt and
adhere to in such an environment, so it would not be surprising to Wnd a number of deci-
sion rule cascades in operation, with investors switching in diVerent ways as a property
boom progressed and with the ‘Xavour of the month’ in terms of a shrewd purchase.
Casual observation suggests an inverse relationship between the rate of increase of
prices and the average time that properties are on the market, except where sellers start get-
ting really greedy and have more trouble Wnding buyers. This is borne out in Peng’s study,
from which Fig. 1 has been adapted, and in the context of the UK housing market recent
work by Baddeley (2005) also reveals periodic explosions in the volume of transactions.
(Baddeley’s work in many ways complements the present paper, except that her analysis of
herding is in terms of cascades of information, not decision rules.) The emergence of such
buying frenzies, in which demand increases for a time even though eVective rates of return
in terms of income Xows are falling, is hard to fathom in terms of a view of rational inves-
tors making choices based on market ‘fundamentals’ but it is compatible with the decision
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rule cascade notion. As with a contagious disease, the more people who seem to be using a
decision rule, the more people will adopt it and so, because of that, the more the decision
rule will appear to be delivering its expected results. Under these circumstances of positive
feedback, the more it will appeal to inexperienced investors, even though they might do
better to consider whether continued capital gains really are likely if rental yields are fall-
ing further and further behind Wnancing and other carrying costs. Meanwhile, the early
investors may judge that if they sell up and cash in their proWts, they will now be able to
make down-payments on (even more) properties in other suburbs that their more sophisti-
cated versions of the ‘invest in property’ decision rule have led them to identify as ripe for
even greater future gains.
From this perspective, the ability of experts with more complex versions of a particular
investment decision rule to keep Wnding new ways of making above-normal returns is a
crucial ingredient in keeping alive a boom in the broader market that is favoured by simpli-
Wed versions of this rule. Questions are less likely to be raised about a simple ‘property is
the thing in which to invest’ rule if some kinds of property investments are doing very well,
even though the failure of many property investments to generate positive cash Xows ought
to be raising doubts about scope for them to deliver capital gains. When the market
appears to have run out of steam in all areas, such illusions and their accompanying deci-
sion rules will be abandoned, and the speculative bubble will burst. As it does so, latecomer
amateurs will suVer a disproportionate part of the losses. We have told this story in terms
of speculative upswings in the housing market, but the principle generalizes to all classes of
Wnancial assets and over all market domains.
5. Modelling decision rule cascades
If the dynamics that we have suggested can be modelled, they may oVer a fresh means
for predicting or anticipating the emergence of aggregate coherent behaviour, that is
Fig. 1. The relationship between rental yields, increases in median house prices and the number of house sales in
Brisbane, Australia, 1998–2003. As the growth of house prices accelerated from 2000 to 2002 the number of
house sales continued to rise even though mortgage interest rates remained steady (not shown) and rental yields
fell. (Includes data prepared by PRD Nationwide. Source: RP Data. Rental yields are for three-bedroomed
houses and were calculated from weekly data from The Residential Tenancies Authority at http://
www.rta.qld.gov.au.)
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complementary to those explored by Sornette (2003, especially Chapters 4 and 6), with the
aid of network theories, to analyse stock market crashes. (For a wider analysis of how indi-
vidual actions involving combinations of imitation and idiosyncratic behaviour can result
in critical events emerging at the aggregate level, see also Sornette, 2004.)
An obvious way to model the concept of a rule cascade as central to the formation of a
speculative bubble is via agent-based modelling in an evolutionary computational frame-
work. The analytic framework of micro meso macro (Dopfer et al., 2004; Dopfer & Potts,
forthcoming) is based on conceptualising economic evolution as a process of ongoing rule
trajectories in which new rules (that specify behaviours, technologies, institutions, organi-
zational forms, etc.) are originated, adopted and diVused through the population of eco-
nomic agents, so leading to a irreversible process of re-coordination of the connective
structure of the macroeconomic system. In this view, an economic system is made of
generic or meso rules, each with a population of carriers (agents) and speciWc connections
to other rules. Structural change is a consequence of a new meso rule, and the origination,
adoption and retention of a new rule permanently changes the coordination structure of
the economic system.
A novel investment decision rule is precisely such a generic rule, and the implication is
that we may model the dynamics of a new investment rule in exactly the same way that we
would model the adoption and diVusion of a new technology. This is easily set up in an
agent-based modelling framework where heterogeneous agents possess variant investment
rules and (stochastic) probabilities of adopting the rules of a neighbour, wherein the spe-
ciWc structure of the network, e.g. random, Moore, small-world, would be expected to have
signiWcant eVect on the extent and path of the decision rule cascade. Market dynamics can
then be simulated to examine the eVect of the introduction and adoption–diVusion of novel
generic rules on price and asset/wealth allocation outcomes, under diVering parametric set-
tings (as in, for example, Morrison, 2004).
There is, however, one major diVerence between modelling the diVusion of technologies
and the diVusion of rules for making investment decisions. In the former case, increasing
involvement of less sophisticated market participants tends to be a good thing, as when it
leads to producer/consumer feedback resulting in products that are better able to do the
things the new users require of them (for example, compare the operating systems of mod-
ern PCs with those of the mid 1980s). In the case of investment decision rules, our argu-
ment is that almost precisely the opposite is true, as the most powerful forms are the early
ones and mass adoption often substantially degraded a rule’s performance.
The degeneration of decision rules is easily modelled in a multi-agent replicator setting
through imposing some kind of entropy condition on the adoption process and with repli-
cator dynamic pay-oVs of rules in relation to the population of others playing the same
strategy. We have not pursued this exercise here. This is not because its raises too many
speciWc issues to be treated in passing, but more because this approach ultimately relies on
speciWc identiWcation of the rules so as to code the multi-agent’s behavioural repertoire and
to seed the system appropriately. As with modelling, our research has not extended to that
yet, and so we must leave this to future work, or to others. A variety of ethnographic meth-
ods could be used to identify rules used by diVerent members of the real population, which
could be used to seed such a model. For studying property investments, these could include
verbal reports and protocol analysis (Ericsson & Simon, 1993), questionnaires and focus
groups, and studies of text from real estate journalists and ‘how to invest in real estate’
books and seminars.
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This paper could be said to be considering decision rules as memes, in the sense sug-
gested by Dawkins (1976), i.e. as replicators of cultural information that one mind trans-
mits to another. As such, it shares a problem with memetic thinking, which treats memes as
fundamental units and tends to take them for granted in studying their transmission and
the eVects of this: in focusing on the degradation of decision rules as they spread through
the population of decision makers we have not addressed the question of how novel rules
come to be generated at the start of the process. To address this question, it will probably
be useful to augment the present evolutionary/behavioural perspective with inputs from
research on entrepreneurship inspired by Austrian economists, particularly the work of
Kirzner (1973), who sees entrepreneurship as arising from an alertness to opportunities for
making money. Since potential ways of making money are not tagged as such, merely wait-
ing to be discovered, alertness must begin with entrepreneurs creatively forming constructs
about where it might be possible to make money (typically by making new connections
between existing ideas or investing in second-order rules for originating and adopting new
decision rules), and then appraising the quality of their conjectures before, so to speak,
placing their bets in Wnancial terms (see Dopfer & Potts, forthcoming; Earl, 2003; Harper,
1996). Clearly, there is considerable scope for psychology to be useful here, not merely
research on creative thought processes but also the ‘constructionist’ literature inspired by
Kelly’s (1955) Psychology of Personal Constructs, research methods from which seem well
suited for comparing diVerences between how the market in question is viewed by those
who originate decision rules and those who attempt to follow them.
The ability to model the circumstances under which inXuential decision makers will pio-
neer new rules and cease employing their versions of rules that others have been latching
on to is clearly important if we are to be able to anticipate the fading away of the original
rule and mutations of it from the decision repertoire of others. There is something of a par-
allel here with the way in which scientiWc disciplines (including economics) evolve, with
ideas percolating down from leading-edge researchers and paradigms/scientiWc research
programmes occasionally being displaced by others that can deal with anomalies better or
otherwise are judged as more promising. However, in the case of the rise and fall of deci-
sion rules in economic systems, the situation is complicated by a reXexive dimension, in
which the spread of rules has an impact on the environment with which the rules were
intended to deal. Thus although the rule pioneers might be like Kirznerian entrepreneurs,
constantly on the look out for/trying to construct better ways of improving their wealth,
they might instead operate in a problem-solving manner, only seeking to come up with new
rules when their existing ones cease to function eVectively due to events in the market that
are consequent on their rules having been adopted by others, with or without suVering deg-
radation. In the latter case, the operation of markets will have a self-sustaining dynamic
whose path will depend on who experiments with new rules and how people change their
rules for judging whom to take seriously as sources of eVective decision rules. Percolation
models from physics, such as those reviewed in Watts (2003), might be adaptable to eco-
nomics for modelling such processes.
6. Conclusion
This paper has introduced the notion of a decision-rule cascade as a means of explaining
interdependent changes in the speculative decisions that people make and how this can
result in the sorts of herding phenomena that, given certain conditions of optimism and
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liquidity, seem to manifest recurrently in stock-market and real-estate booms and bubbles.
These macro-dynamics have micro-foundations that turn upon the heterogeneity of agents
and the way they learn new investment rules. The explanation of why things go up is the
same as the explanation of why things go down, namely the evolutionary consequence of
the adoption of new behavioural rules. We have considered this mainly in the speciWc con-
text of speculative investment in residential property, but the principle is general. The
structure of investment is a function of the investment rules that agents have acquired and
the structure of these rules evolves whenever new rules are introduced and are subse-
quently adopted and retained. Sometimes this leads to wealth creation; sometimes it leads
to bubbles. The outcome is necessarily uncertain.
This behavioural/evolutionary analysis presented here is intended to complement Min-
sky’s (1975) extension of Keynes’s work in which the focus is on the changes that occur in
agents as a boom gathers pace and the mood of market participants goes from cautious to
euphoric and so the proportion of the population engaging in speculation goes from few to
many. Our general point is that, across the spectrum of Wnancial assets, this is something
that happens rather regularly and not rarely. Like Minsky, we see the investment process
as prone to result in some speculators making expensive errors, and this is particularly
likely where novices pick up and apply degraded versions of decision rules late in a boom.
The cascade process we have outlined here is not inherently a cascade towards all specula-
tors using broadly the same rule as an equilibrium adjustment, for although all rules are
socially transmitted, and although people will have a variety of rules between which to
choose, they will also have no obvious rule for working out which rule is yet the best one.
There is no solution to the rational investment problem because every strategy promotes a
higher-order counter-strategy. Such is the permanently restless condition of all speculative
markets that lie beyond the realm of known probabilities and so deWne the realm of funda-
mental uncertainty (Shackle, 1972, 1974). In such a world, speculative bubbles are just as
likely as depressive slumps because knowledge can grow as a function of the optimism or
pessimism laden in the investment rules acquired by agents along the way.
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